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Abstract
Information pollution is a serious problem for modern society. Many people
consider that increase of information often makes them confuse. However,
economists usually treats information as what always improves utility. The
problem of disutility of information is still mostly unlooked.
This paper focuses on the problem of information pollution, especially
excess information provided by supplier. We name information provided by
supplier a catalog. We consider a market with catalog sales, and assume
that thicker catalog must bore the consumer. If supplier makes his catalog
thicker, then he can sell more products, instead of discouraging consumer to
search and buy so that other supplier can sell less products. This situation
is very similar to the case of $‘(\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{y}$ of the commons”, where the grass of
the commons is consumer’s motivation to buy in this context.
We analyze this situation in the framework of oligopoly model. Consider
a two-stage game. In first stage, $N$ suppliers determine quantity $q_{n}\geq 0$ ,
thickness of catalog $k_{n}\in[0, q_{n}]$ and price $p_{n}$ : $[0, q_{n}]arrow \mathbb{R}_{+}$ . In second stage,
one consumer chooses his action from “search independent of catalog and
buy(type 1)”, $‘(\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}$ by catalog and buy(type 2)” or “not buy(type 3)” for
each commodity. For $i\in\{1,2.3\},$ $H_{i}^{n}$ denotes the set of the commodity
produced by supplier $n$ for which consumer chooses “type $i$” . $u>0$ denotes
consumer’s payoff when he gets a commodity, $C>0$ the cost to search a
commodity independent of catalog and $c_{0}(k)=a_{0}+b_{0}k$ the cost to search a
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commodity for catalog. So consumer’s total payoff is
$\sum_{n}[\int_{H_{1}^{n}}(u-p_{n}-C)d\lambda+\int_{H_{2}^{n}}(u-p_{n}-c_{0}(\sum_{n}k_{n}))d\lambda]$ ,
where A denotes Lebesgue measure. Supplier’s payoff is
$\int_{H_{1}^{n}\cup H_{2}^{n}}p_{n}d\lambda-c_{1}(k_{n})-c_{2}(q_{n})$ ,
where $c_{1}(k_{n})=b_{1}k_{n}$ denotes the cost of catalog and $c_{2}(q_{n})=b_{2}q_{n}$ denotes
the cost of production.
We assume $b_{0},$ $b_{1},$ $b_{2}>0,$ $u>a_{0}+b_{1}+b_{2}$ and $C>u-b_{2}$ and show that un-
der these assumptions, the result of this two-stage game comes from subgame-




decreases as $N$ increases, as usual. However, total surplus $\frac{N}{(N+1)^{2}}\frac{(u-a0-b_{1}-b_{2})^{2}}{b_{0}}$
also decreases as $N$ increases.
This “counterfeit competition” may happen when the cost consumers
search a commodity is not negligible. So we should take notice that this sit-
uation. Even if new entry of supplier induces markdown, it may be inefficient
in fact.
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